Staci Sconiers v. USA by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-24-2018 
Staci Sconiers v. USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Staci Sconiers v. USA" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 593. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/593 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-3440 
_____________ 
 
STACI SCONIERS, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA1 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-17-cv-01835) 
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini 
______________ 
 
  
                                              
 1 The Court notes that the original complaint included 
fictitious parties who have not participated in the case.  
Accordingly, the caption is hereby amended to reflect that the 
United States is the only defendant and appellee in this case.   
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 18, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., RESTREPO, and BIBAS, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 24, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION  
______________ 
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Newark, NJ, 07102 
  Counsel for Appellant 
 
Craig Carpenito 
Kruti D. Dharia 
Office of United States Attorney 
970 Broad Street 
Newark, N.J., 07102 
  Counsel for Appellee 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Staci Sconiers asks us to reinstate her tort claim against 
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (2012), because she presented 
her claim to the United States Postal Service (USPS) within 
 3 
 
two years, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).  We decline to 
do so because we hold that the FTCA additionally requires 
claimants to file their claims within six months of an agency’s 
written denial, which Sconiers failed to do.  We will affirm the 
District Court.2 
I. FACTS 
 This case arises from a car accident that occurred on 
January 6, 2016, in Newark, New Jersey, between a car driven 
by Sconiers and a vehicle owned by USPS.  About two weeks 
after the accident, Sconiers submitted an administrative tort 
claim form to USPS seeking damages for injuries that she 
claimed she suffered in the accident.     
 Approximately seven months later, by letter dated July 
14, 2016, and addressed to Sconiers’s counsel, USPS denied 
her claim.  The letter, citing the FTCA—i.e., 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2401(b) and the relevant regulation—informed Sconiers that 
if she was “dissatisfied with the Postal Service’s final denial,” 
she “may file suit in a United States District Court no later than 
six (6) months after the date the Postal Service mails the notice 
                                              
 2 In the judgment, the District Court ordered that all 
claims against the defendants be “dismissed with prejudice.”  
App. 2 (emphasis omitted).  This characterization of the 
Government’s motion for summary judgment motion is 
incorrect “[b]ecause the grant of summary judgment and the 
dismissal of the complaint are inconsistent.”  Cheminor Drugs, 
Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 121 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Therefore, “we will disregard reference to the ‘dismissal’ of 
[Sconiers’s] complaint and treat the record as a summary 
judgment record.”  Id.  
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of that final action.”  App. 19.  Sconiers, however, filed her 
complaint before the District Court eight months later—or two 
months after the limitations period that USPS alleges that the 
FTCA requires—and named as defendants, inter alia, USPS 
and Stephan D. Johnson, who was the driver of the USPS truck.  
 The United States moved before the District Court to be 
substituted in place of USPS and Johnson, as well as for 
summary judgment.  It contended that Sconiers’s failure to file 
her lawsuit within six months of the mailing of the denial of 
her administrative claim rendered her lawsuit untimely.  
Sconiers did not contest the substitution of the United States, 
but urged the District Court to equitably toll the statute of 
limitations.   
 The District Court found that Sconiers’s complaint was 
filed beyond the FTCA’s six-month statute of limitations and 
determined that she had not identified any extraordinary 
circumstance that justified equitable tolling of the deadline.  
Accordingly, it granted the Government’s motions.  This 
appeal followed.  
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II. DISCUSSION3 
 
 “As a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit 
unless it consents to be sued.” White-Squire v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010).  The FTCA is “a 
limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United 
States,” Miller v. Phila. Geriatric Ctr., 463 F.3d 266, 270 (3d 
Cir. 2006), that provides that:  
The United States shall be liable, respecting the 
provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in 
the same manner and to the same extent as a 
private individual under like circumstances, but 
                                              
 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b)(1) and the federal-question statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  “Our review of the District Court’s [summary 
judgment] decision is plenary, and we apply the same standard 
as the District Court to determine whether summary judgment 
was appropriate.”  State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro 
Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009).  Thus, summary 
judgment is properly granted “if the movant shows that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
For the reasons below, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
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shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment 
or for punitive damages. 
28 U.S.C. § 2674; see also Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 
176, 179 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The Federal Torts [sic] Claims Act 
is a partial abrogation of the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity that permits suits for torts against the United 
States.”).   
 “To make a claim under the FTCA, a claimant first must 
file her claim with the administrative agency allegedly 
responsible for her injuries.”  Santos ex rel. Beato v. United 
States, 559 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 2009).  The statute provides: 
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim 
against the United States for money damages for 
injury or loss of property or personal injury or 
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 
omission of any employee of the Government 
while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, unless the claimant shall have first 
presented the claim to the appropriate Federal 
agency and his claim shall have been finally 
denied by the agency in writing and sent by 
certified or registered mail.  
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).  The FTCA also provides for a statute of 
limitations that a claimant seemingly must abide by in order to 
recover:   
A tort claim against the United States shall be 
forever barred unless it is presented in writing to 
the appropriate Federal agency within two years 
after such claim accrues or unless action is begun 
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within six months after the date of mailing, by 
certified or registered mail, of notice of final 
denial of the claim by the agency to which it was 
presented. 
Id. § 2401(b) (emphasis added).   
 At issue in this case is whether the FTCA requires—as 
the Government argues—that a claimant file both a claim with 
the federal agency within two years of the tort and a suit within 
six months of the agency’s denial, or—as Sconiers contends 
based on the provision’s use of the word “or”—that a plaintiff 
satisfies the limitations period by meeting just one of the two 
conditions.  In considering this matter, we note that “[b]ecause 
the Federal Tort Claims Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign 
immunity, the Act’s established procedures have been strictly 
construed.”  White-Squire, 592 F.3d at 456 (quoting Livera v. 
First Nat’l State Bank of N.J., 879 F.2d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 
1989)). 
 We agree with the Government and hold that both 
conditions must be satisfied in order for a plaintiff to properly 
bring a claim under the FTCA.  The Sixth Circuit has aptly 
explained why, and we adopt its reasoning today:     
Context provides considerable support for this 
reading. Claimants, remember, must present 
their claims to the relevant agency before 
bringing suit in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2675(a). And if we construe the Act’s time bar 
to mean that the claimant must fail to satisfy both 
deadlines, that would pull at least two threads out 
of a coherent reading of the provisions. For one, 
a claimant cannot receive a notice of denial—the 
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trigger for the six-month limitations rule—until 
she has filed an administrative claim. The statute 
thus plainly contemplates that one act (the 
administrative filing) will precede the other 
(court filing) and thus most naturally requires 
claimants to satisfy both deadlines. 
For another, the alternative would effectively 
eliminate any court deadline. It would mean that 
(1) claimants could wait as long as they wished 
before presenting tort claims to agencies as long 
as they filed the claim within six months of any 
denial or (2) they could present their claims to 
agencies within two years of accrual and then 
wait as long as they wished to file suit in district 
court. But no one doubts that Congress meant to 
impose some time limitation on administrative 
and court filings, and, if we left the Act without 
a meaningful time limitation, we would be 
“tak[ing] it upon ourselves to extend the waiver 
[of sovereign immunity] beyond that which 
Congress intended.” United States v. 
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117–18, 100 S.Ct. 352, 
62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979).  
. . . [T]he fact that the statute uses the disjunctive 
does not by itself tell us anything. The question 
remains whether the statute sets forth alternative 
ways of barring a claim or alternative ways of 
preserving a claim. A statute that precludes an 
action if the claimant (disjunctively) fails to meet 
either of two requirements generally will come 
to the same end as a statute that requires the 
claimant (conjunctively) to fulfill both 
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requirements. In barring an action if the claimant 
fails to meet the agency-filing deadline (because 
it is not “presented in writing to the appropriate 
Federal agency within two years after such claim 
accrues”) “or” if the claimant fails to meet the 
court-filing deadline (because it is not “begun 
within six months after the date of mailing, by 
certified or registered mail, of notice of final 
denial of the claim by the agency to which it was 
presented”), the statute bars claims that fail to 
meet either deadline.  
Ellison v. United States, 531 F.3d 359, 361–63 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 Our holding today is consistent with our strict 
construction of the FTCA and with how we have described the 
FTCA’s filing requirements in the past.4  It also aligns this 
                                              
 4 For example, in Lightfoot v. United States, we stated 
that:  
The FTCA precludes suit against the United 
States unless the claimant has first presented the 
claim to the relevant Federal agency and the 
claim has been finally denied. . . .  After the 
denial of an administrative claim, the claimant 
has two options: (1) he may file suit in the 
District Court within six months of the denial 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); or (2) he may 
file a request for reconsideration directly with the 
agency to which the claim was originally made.  
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Court’s precedent with that of every other circuit to have 
considered this issue, each of which has held that both 
conditions must be satisfied.  See Sanchez v. United States, 740 
F.3d 47, 50 n.6 (1st Cir. 2014) (“We read this disjunctive 
language [of § 2401(b)] as setting out two deadlines, both (not 
just either) of which must be satisfied.”); Houston v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Though 
phrased in the disjunctive, this statute requires a claimant to 
file an administrative claim within two years and file suit 
within six months of its denial.”); Dyniewicz v. United States, 
742 F.2d 484, 485 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act a claim must be filed with the appropriate federal 
agency within two years of its accrual and suit must be 
commenced within six months of the agency’s denial of the 
claim.”) (Kennedy, J.); Willis v. United States, 719 F.2d 608, 
612-13 (2d Cir. 1983) (considering the legislative history and 
concluding that § 2401(b) requires that both deadlines must be 
met); Schuler v. United States, 628 F.2d 199, 201-02 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (en banc) (per curiam) (same). 
 Here, Sconiers does not dispute that she filed her 
complaint before the District Court eight months after USPS 
delivered her notice of denial to her counsel’s office.  
Furthermore, on appeal, she does not argue that the statute of 
limitations should be tolled—accordingly, she has waived this 
argument.5  See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 
                                              
564 F.3d 625, 626–27 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and footnotes 
omitted). 
 
 5 Sconiers argues for the first time on appeal that the 
FTCA’s time limitations are unconstitutional and that barring 
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222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s failure 
to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes 
waiver of that issue on appeal.”).  Because Sconiers did not 
bring this case within the six-month period required by 
§ 2401(b), the District Court properly held that her lawsuit was 
untimely.  See Ellison, 531 F.3d at 363 (“And because [the 
claimant] failed to meet the second deadline, that dooms the 
action.”). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.   
                                              
her from pursuing this lawsuit will deny her due process of law 
and equal protection.  However, we find that this argument is 
waived because she did not raise it before the District Court.  
See, e.g., United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 727 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“[A]rguments not raised in the district courts are waived 
on appeal.”).   
 
